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PROVING RACE DISCRIMINATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES USING
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
MARC PRICE WOLF*
Introduction
Many criminal justice litigants today present claims of race
bias.' It is certainly true that statistical race disparities abound in
the criminal justice system.2 Yet in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme
Court held that, normally, statistical race disparities do not establish
a constitutional violation.3 McCleskey and its rationale stands as a
bar to the pursuit of race bias claims based on statistical proof.
This note explores a few ways in which criminal defendants
might attempt to prove racial discrimination in their case by using
statistical studies to support their claim even after McCleskey.4 In
* Law Clerk for Ninth Circuit Judge Andrew Kleinfeld (2007-2008); J.D., University
of California Hastings College of the Law (2007); M.P.P., Goldman School of Public
Policy, University of California, Berkeley (2004). I would like to thank Rory Little and
Ashutosh Bhagwat for their comments and mentorship. I am grateful to all of the
members of the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for their hard work on this issue. I
especially want to thank my wife and my best friend, Jennifer, for her constant support
and guidance. A special thank you to my soon-to-be-born daughter, whose existence
reminds me that miracles do happen.
1. Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 2109 (2004).
2. See General Accounting Office, infra note 8.
3. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (noting in order for McCleskey to
prevail on his equal protection claim, he must first prove that the "decisionmakers in his
case acted with discriminatory purpose." (original italics)).
4. In this paper I am not exploring claimants experiences of racial discrimination in
their own cases; i.e., how a particular defendant observed prosecutors use racial epithets
or explicit policies that single out a particular race for maltreatment. Rather, I will
describe studies performed by scientists who analyze and describe specific trends
among individuals and social groups. Often these studies encompass the use of
complicated statistical tools to help better understand various social phenomena. The
main purposes of these studies are to either describe past trends in society, to predict
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Part I, I illustrate how the Supreme Court has set an extremely high
threshold for proving racial discrimination with statistical studies in
a criminal justice context. Thus, I begin by analyzing the landmark
death penalty decision McCleskey v. Kemp. But I conclude that even
after McCleskey, this threshold is not insurmountable. I describe the
ways in which future litigants must craft their studies in order for a
McCleskey-like challenge to prevail. I also argue that lower courts
have read McCleskey too broadly. I advocate a more narrow reading
of the opinion which would allow courts more leeway in analyzing
statistically valid studies in claims regarding race and the death
penalty.
In Part II of this note, I analyze United States v. Armstrong and
the overarching question of how to obtain discovery from the
government in a selective prosecution claim based on race. Again,
the Court has also set a very high threshold for when statistical
studies can meet this legal standard to obtain discovery -but, as
above, the threshold should not be interpreted as insurmountable. I
will argue that lower courts have applied Armstrong too strictly. I
then offer suggestions to future litigants who wish to buttress their
Armstrong claim with strong statistical studies.
In Part III, I briefly explore the Supreme Court's treatment of
social scientific studies in areas of criminal justice law not linked to
race. I note that in two recent landmark decisions, that outlawed the
use of the death penalty on juveniles5 and the mentally retarded,6
the Court took a much more uncritical approach to analyzing social
scientific evidence. In these cases, the majority of the Supreme
Court adopted conclusions from these studies wholesale without
any careful analysis.7
I conclude by suggesting that although social scientific studies
have often failed to convince courts of the presence of racial
discrimination in the criminal justice context, the use of this type of
evidence in these claims should not be undervalued. Litigants
should continue to work with social scientists to craft and present
courts with sound and convincing studies in order to realize the
potential of statistically documenting widespread racial
discrimination.
future outcomes in a particular setting, or a combination of both.
5. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
7. The dissenters in both of these cases criticize the majority for not sufficiently
analyzing the statistical evidence. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 616-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342-54 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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I. Proving Race Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty
A. Death Penalty Statistics
Many researchers exploring the relationship between the
administration of the death penalty and race have concluded that
historically, and even today, the death penalty is imposed
disproportionately among races. 8, 9 Although many studies have not
conclusively shown a race-of-defendant bias, most illustrate a strong
race-of-victim bias.10, 11 These studies all reflect similar results
despite significant variation in each state's death eligibility statutes12
and the number of death sentences annually imposed.'3
8. See General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicated
Pattern of Racial Disparities (1990). This study reviewed twenty-eight of the most
relevant studies to date on the administration of the death penalty around the country.
While some researchers such as Stephen P. Klein and John E. Rolph, report no
statistically significant racial effect in terms of the application of the death penalty and
the race of the defendant, they still find a significant relationship between race of the
victim and the selective administration of the death penalty. See Stephen P. Klein &
John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race for Death Penalty Sentences in
California, 32 JURIMETRICS 33, 43 (1991); see also Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or
Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 777, 778 (1990-91)
("[Iun state after state, a defendant is far more likely to receive the death penalty for a
particular capital murder if his victim white than if his victim is black.").
9. It is important to note that often, researchers incorrectly interchange their
description of these statistical differences as both "discrimination" and/or "disparities."
In this note, "disparities" simply describes statistical differences between various
groups, whereas "discrimination" refers to the unfair treatment of a person or group on
the basis of prejudice. Even though the line between disparities and discrimination is
often thin and hard to discern, the terms should not be used interchangeably.
10. Race-of-defendant bias means that the death penalty is imposed
disproportionately according to the race of the defendant; whereas race-of-victim bias
means that the death penalty is imposed disproportionately according to the race of the
victim in the underlying crime.
11. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1742-45 (1998) (offering a fairly recent overview of statistical
findings of race of defendant or race of victim disparities in the administration of capital
punishment around the country).
12. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 373
(1995) (" [d]eath eligibility [among states] remains remarkably broad -indeed, nearly as
broad as under the expansive statutes characteristic of the pre-Furman era.").
13. See generally William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and
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In 1990, the federal General Accounting Office ("GAO")
evaluated more than fifty relevant studies to conclude that race
played an influential role in the charging and sentencing decisions
in capital cases. 14 Although half of the studies initially compiled
were not included in the final analysis because they were not
methodologically rigorous, 5 the remaining studies showed that "in
82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the
likelihood" that a capital-eligible defendant would receive the death
penalty.' 6  The GAO also stated that this conclusion "was
remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data collection
methods, and analytic techniques." 17 Race of defendant bias was
also present in more than half of the studies, but this factor was not
as "clear cut" as race of victim bias.'8
A more recent study conducted in 1998, on capital cases in
Philadelphia found significant bias in the administration of the
death penalty against murderers of non-black victims19 as well as a
significant bias against black defendants. 20 This study analyzed 524
death-eligible cases from 1983-199321 and found that the primary
source of the racial disparities was the jury rather than a
prosecutor's charging discretion.22 Similarly, a well-designed study
commissioned by Maryland Governor Parris Glendening in 2000
found a significant bias against black defendants in capital cases
between 1978 and 1999.23
It is important to note that studies of capital punishment that
have found racial disparities do not necessarily conclude that they
have found racial discrimination. For instance, a 1980 study in Dade
County, Florida, of 350 cases in which defendants were indicted for
Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variation in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1505, 1552-56 (2002) (describing the number of new death sentences each by state).
14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCHING
INDICATES PATINERS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 2 (1990).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 5.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 6.
19. See Baldus et al., supra note 11, at 1714-15.
20. See id. at 1713-14.
21. See id. at 1667, 1669, 1671.
22. See id. at 1715.
23. See Raymond Pasternoster, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland's Death
Sentencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction, (2003),
available at http://www.urhome.umd.edu/dewsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf (last visited
Mar. 11, 2006) (finding that blacks who kill whites and are eligible for the death penalty
are two and one-half times more likely to be sentenced to death than are whites who kill
whites, three and one-half times more likely than are blacks who kill blacks, and almost
eleven times more likely to be sentenced to death than "other" racial combinations).
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first degree murder between 1973 and 197624 reported no conclusive
evidence of racial discrimination.25 Although the researcher
observed that the murderers of white victims received the death
penalty more often, this disparity arose primarily from the
aggravated nature of the cases, rather than just the race of the
victim. 26
I offer these studies to give the reader a glimpse into the
enormous amount of ink spilled trying to prove or disprove racial
disparities in the administration of capital punishment. Although
these studies have contributed to scholarly debate, they have not
convinced the courts that imposing the death penalty in a racially
disproportionate manner violates the constitution.27 The main
reason for this can be traced back to April 22, 1987, when the United
States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision, McCleskey v.
Kemp.28 In McCleskey, the Court set such a high threshold for proving
racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty with
statistical evidence that, according to many scholars, the door to
proving this type of claim has been closed forever. 29
B. McCleskey v. Kemp
In 1978, a Georgia jury sentenced Warren McCleskey, an
African American, to death for murdering a white police officer
during the course of a robbery.30 After a failed direct appeal of his
sentence, McCleskey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court which raised the claim that the "Georgia capital
sentencing process is administered in a racially discriminatory
manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
24. See Steven D. Arkin, Note, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment:
An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida, 1973-1976, 33 STAN L.
REV. 75, 86 (1980).
25. See id. at 100 (arguing that the statistics "reveal no conclusive evidence of racial
discrimination when the difference between felony murders and non-felony murders is
taken into account.").
26. See id. at 100-01. ("The significantly greater proportion of felony murders in
interracial killings and the predominance of white victims in these killings explains
apparent disparities in capital sentencing.").
27. See Baldus et al., supra note 11, at 1734. ("The [McCleskey] decision has largely
eliminated the federal courts as a forum for the consideration of statistically based
claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing.").
28. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
29. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection, and
Correction, 51 WASH & LEE. L. REV. 359, 374 (1994).
30. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283-85 (1987).
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the United States Constitution." 31 McCleskey could not point to any
direct race-bias evidence in his case. Instead, McCleskey's main
source of evidence in this claim were two sophisticated statistical
studies which analyzed more than 2,000 murder cases that occurred
in Georgia between 1973-1979.32 Commonly referred to as the
Baldus study (named after the lead researcher of the study,
Professor David Baldus), the analysis divided the cases according to
a combination of the race of the defendant and the race of the
victim.3 3 The study also controlled for 230 variables other than race
which might have explained the disparities in the administration of
the death penalty.
The results of the study convincingly show a racially
disproportionate application of the death penalty in Georgia during
the years that McCleskey was sentenced.3 4 After performing a
multiple regression analysis, the study found that defendants
charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive
a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.35 The
Court also acknowledged that "the Baldus study indicates that black
defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have the
greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty." 36 Baldus could
not find any latent factors that could have substantially explained
the racial differences. 37 The study more specifically showed that
prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty in a case
involving a white victim. Georgia prosecutors requested the death
penalty in 70 percent of the cases involving black defendants and
white victims; 32 percent of the cases involving white defendants
and white victims; 15 percent of the case involving black defendants
and black victims; and 19 percent of the cases involving white
31. Id. at 286.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Randall L Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1398-1400 & nn.40-47. The Baldus study is
accepted within the social scientific community as a careful, thorough, and statistically
valid study. The district court's opinion in McCleskey spent considerable time
deconstructing the study and finding fault in its methodology and conclusions. The
district court claimed that the study did not account for important variables which could
have altered Baldus' conclusions. Kennedy, as well as many social scientists have
addressed the district court's arguments and have concluded that the Baldus study
actually accounted for each of the variables that the district court claimed were absent.
Therefore, the district court's criticisms of the Baldus study's methodology do not hold
water.
35. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
36. Id.
37. Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the
Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 2109 (2004).
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defendants and black victims.38 The study also found that racial
factors were most likely to play a role in sentencing in cases that
presented the greatest degree of jury discretion.39
Although the majority opinion in McCleskey assumed the
statistical validity of the Baldus study,40 the Court found that the
sophisticated multiple regression analysis did not establish
purposeful racial discrimination.41 For McCleskey to prevail on his
equal protection claim, he must first prove that the "decisionmakers
in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."42 The Court noted
that at best, a sophisticated multiple regression analysis can only
"demonstrate a risk that the factor of race entered into some capital
sentencing decision and a necessarily lesser risk that race entered
into any particular sentencing decision."43 The Court continued to
state that these statistics did not prove that any of the specific actors
(i.e., the judge, jury, or prosecutor, etc.) in McCleskey's case acted
with discriminatory intent; and "at most, the Baldus study indicates
a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race." 44 The next
section will show how the McCleskey Court's great
misunderstanding of statistics has affected the modem equal
protection doctrine.
38. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 (1987).
39. Id. at 287 n.5 (noting, for instance, in mid-range cases (the cases in which juries
may exercise the greatest discretion), 14.4 percent of black victim cases resulted in the
death penalty, compared with 34.4 percent of white victim mid-range cases). See also,
Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 198 (1986).
(noting that when the facts of the case do not clearly dictate either a life or death
sentence, the decisionmaker is liberated to take into account other, impermissible
factors).
40. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 n.7 (rejecting, implicitly, criticisms of the Baldus
study's methodology).
41. Id. at 292.
42. Id. The majority also did not find a discriminatory purpose behind Georgia's use
of its death penalty statute without proof that Georgia adopted the statute because of its
discriminatory effect. In selecting or reaffirming a particular course of action, the
decisionmaker must act at least in part "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 298 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
43. Id. n.7.
44. Id. at 312. Here, the court incorrectly equates the import of a simple correlation
analysis with that of a multiple regression analysis. A correlation analysis describes a
linear relationship between two variables (for instance, foot size strongly correlates
positively with height in that taller people usually have big feet), whereas a multiple
regression assesses the impact of a set of independent variables on a dependant variable.
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C. The McClesky Court, Equal Protection, and Statistics 101
Ultimately the Supreme Court was not willing to find that the
Baldus study satisfied the "purpose/intent" requirement of the
equal protection doctrine. The Supreme Court articulated the
modern standard for proving an equal protection violation in
Washington v. Davis (1976).45 The Davis Court stated that a violation
of the equal protection clause based on racial discrimination must
show that the state has engaged in purposeful, or intentional,
discrimination. Three years later, the Court noted that even if a
decisionmaker knows of the discriminatory effect of a decision, the
equal protection clause is only violated if the decision is made
"'because of,' not merely, 'in spite of,' its adverse effect upon an
identified group."46
The McCleskey opinion seems to state that statistical showings
of racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty will
never satisfy the "intent" requirement in an equal protection claim.
In McCleskey the Court noted that reliance on the use of statistical
evidence is uniquely inappropriate in the context of capital
sentencing (as compared to employment discrimination cases where
intent is commonly proven with statistics) 47 because of the presence
of substantial "discretion" among various decisionmakers in the
context of capital sentencing. 48  The Court thereby grants,
mistakenly I argue, the concept of "discretion" a virtual immunity
under the equal protection doctrine.
While the presence of discretion in the death penalty context
means that various actors, from judges to juries to prosecutors, are
influenced by numerous factors in their decisionmaking, it does not
mean that these decisions are entirely random. 49 The specific
purpose of a multiple regression analysis, such as the Baldus study,
is to account for as many factors as a researcher can think of to
account for an outcome. In the Baldus study, the researchers
45. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (holding that even though African
Americans failed an entrance examination rate for a job with the Washington D.C. police
department at four times the rate of other applicants, this discriminatory effect alone did
not violate the Equal Protection Doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment).
46. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
47. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-97.
48. See id.
49. Evan Tsen Lee and Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SuP. CT. REV.
145, 156 (1998). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) (standing for the
proposition that if discretion truly meant that a decision was wholly random, then the
death penalty would be unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment).
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compiled 230 relevant variables that might have accounted for the
outcome of a defendant receiving the death penalty. Although all of
these factors could have a potential impact on the outcome, a
multiple regression analysis determines which variables actually do
play a role in the outcome. Therefore, even though a statistical
study can never prove direct causation, through the process of
elimination, it can provide incredibly strong circumstantial evidence
of causation. In McCleskey's case, the Baldus study showed that the
race of the victim played a substantial role on the outcome of
whether an individual would receive the death penalty.50
The Court misunderstood this relationship as a simple racial
correlation. 51  In the decade previous to McCleskey, the Court
confronted three notable equal protection claims based on race
discrimination, and in each case the Court was presented with
simple racial correlation issues. In Washington v. Davis (1976), a
group of African Americans claimed the Washington D.C. police
officer entrance examination violated the equal protection clause
because African Americans failed the exam at a rate four times that
of white applicants.52 The Court held that the differences in
outcomes cannot alone establish an equal protection violation.53 In
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (1977), the Court
rejected an equal protection challenge to a city zoning ordinance
that blatantly excluded low-income housing residents, a majority of
whom were minorities. 54 Finally, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
(1979), the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a
Massachusetts law that granted a preference in state hiring to
veterans even though the law greatly reduced the public
employment opportunities available to women.55 In these three
cases, the equal protection challenge was primarily based on using
statistical evidence of a strong correlation effect to prove a
discriminatory intent on behalf of the legislature. Each time, the
Court restated its principle that intent could not be proven with this
type of evidence, no matter how strong the correlation.
Correlation studies leave plaintiffs open to the valid criticism
that race or gender might simply correlate with another causal
factor that accounted for the disparate outcome.56 A correlation
50. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 (noting that murderers who killed white victims
were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than a murderer of a black
defendant).
51. See id. at 287 n.5.
52. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977).
55. Personnel Administrators v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
56. See Lee & Bhagwat, supra note 49, at 159.
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describes the extent to which two or more things are related to one
another.57 Graphically, a correlation is the degree to which two
variables form a straight line when plotted on a scatter diagram. For
instance, if height is plotted on the x-axis, and foot size is plotted on
the y axis, and this information was gathered from 25 randomly
surveyed people, you would likely find a strong linear relationship
between the data points. This means that there is a strong positive
correlation between a person's foot size and his/her height. But foot
size does not cause height, and vice versa.
Correlations can even be used to explain the action of several
independent variables taken together. For example, a researcher
could use multiple correlations to measure the combined effects of
age and years of education on individuals' income. But correlations
cannot parse out the individual effect of each independent variable
when many independent variables are present. For instance it
cannot tell the researcher specifically how much an effect age has on
an individuals' income when holding education constant.
Therefore, the Court is wise to shy away from relying on these types
of studies to prove purposeful race discrimination.
The multiple regression study presented in McCleskey was
markedly different from the correlation studies presented to the
Court in previous cases. Multiple regression analysis answers two
main questions. First, it can measure the total effect on the
dependent variable of all of the independent variables taken
together. 58  But this measurement only provides the same
information as a correlation analysis. Second, and most
significantly, it can explain the effect on a dependant variable of a
one-unit change in an independent variable, while controlling for
the effects of all the other independent variables. When the Baldus
study was able to hold constant 230 relevant independent factors, it
could then validly measure the effect-an actual causal effect-of
the victim's race on whether an individual received the death
penalty in Georgia. Properly understood, the multiple regression
analysis by Baldus thus actually proved that there was a substantial
probability that McCleskey would not have been sentenced to death
if his victim was not white.59
At the end of the McCleskey opinion, the Court revealed that its
policy concerns weighed heavily in deciding how to interpret the
statistical evidence. The McCleskey Court feared that granting relief
57. W. PAUL VOGT, DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS & METHODOLOGY: A NONTECHNICAL
GUIDE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 64 (Lisa Cuevas Shaw ed., Sage Publications, Inc. 2005)
(2005).
58. See id. at 200-01.
59. See Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 728 (1983).
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in this case would open the door to many similar challenges to
criminal convictions in contexts other than death penalty.60 The
prevalence of racial disparities throughout the criminal justice
system almost assured the Court of this outcome. 61 If the Baldus
study were truly a simple correlation analysis, then the Court's
concern would be valid. Here though, the Baldus study was much
more sophisticated than the Court acknowledged. The dissent even
went so far as to label this concern as "a fear of too much justice." 62
D. Prevailing With Statistical Evidence After McCleskey
In this note, I have maintained that the Baldus study should
have provided sufficient evidence to prevail in an equal protection
challenge. The remainder of this paper, however, generally
describes how future litigants can build on the Baldus framework to
win similar challenges. In order for the Supreme Court to validate a
racial discrimination equal protection claim based on a sophisticated
statistical study, the Court does not have to overrule McCleskey.
Despite the propensity of lower courts to read McCleskey broadly
and universally deny this type of equal protection challenge, 63
courts retain the flexibility to allow claimants to prevail on such a
challenge. Although success though depends on three factors: (1) a
study will have to be methodologically rigorous; (2) the study
should focus on repeat actors within the criminal justice system,
rather than attempt to implicate the system as a whole; and (3) the
study should conclude the existence of a striking level of racial
disparities.
1. Methodology of a McCleskey Claim
There are several major issues for the Court to be aware of
when analyzing a multiple regression analysis. The first is sample
size. Small sample sizes often do not generalize well and are of little
scientific value.64 There are two ways to determine whether the
sample size is large enough to make generalizations. In order to
create a reliable multiple regression, a study must have either fifteen
60. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 315 n.38.
61. See id.
62. See McCleskey, 481 US. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See Baldus et al., supra note 11, at 1714-15.
64. JULIE PALLANT, SPSS SURVIVAL MANUAL: A STEP BY STEP GUIDE TO DATA
ANALYSIS USING SPSS 142 (Open University Press 2005) (2001).
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subjects per variable, 65 or the sample size must satisfy the following
formula for calculating sample size requirements: N > 50 + 8m
(where m = number of independent variables) 66 are needed for a
reliable equation.
A second issue is outliers. Multiple regression analyses are
sensitive to very high or very low scores. While social scientists
have various methods for dealing with outlier problems, the court
should be most concerned with studies that fail to address this issue
and allow outliers to skew the results.67
A third issue is the manner in which the variables were
selected. In fact the most important issue for a court to take notice
of when analyzing these types of studies is the manner in which the
independent variables, that are believed to influence the dependent
variable, were selected. An erroneous inclusion or exclusion of
variables will greatly impact whether the study is explaining a true
systematic relationship. Therefore, it is vitally important that at
some stage of the analysis, the researcher includes all the variables
that could possibly have a significant effect on the dependent
variable. 68 The researcher must separately examine those variables
that he or she thinks are actually important, and then test what
happens when additional variables are included. 69 Proceeding any
other way will likely lead to invalid results. For instance, if the
researcher first analyzes all the variables together and then deduces
that certain factors appear to correlate with the dependent variable,
a true test of the relationship will not result.70 Also, this erroneous
methodology might leave out variables that should be included in
the model.71
One possible approach a court should take when reviewing
these studies is to appoint a special master-a statistics expert-to
provide a neutral interpretation of the study. A special master's
report or testimony on the study will likely decrease the chance that
a court will make erroneous rulings on statistical misinterpretations.
Modern legal arguments are often made by relying on highly
technical evidence. Although the Supreme Court has recently
revisited the evidentiary standard for when a party can submit
65. See JAMES STEVENS, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
72 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc. 1996) (1995).
66. BARBARA G. TABAACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS
117 (George A. Middendorf ed., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 2001) (1983).
67. See PALLANT, supra note 64, at 143.
68. Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
702, 713-14 (1980).
69. See id. at 714.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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scientific reports as reliable evidence, 72 the Court has not effectively
created a standard for when it should be required to seek outside
help to understand scientific studies upon which an entire case
could ultimately rely upon.73
2. Focus on Repeat Actors
The McCleskey Court noted that the nature of capital sentencing
decisions was fundamentally different from decisions made in other
contexts. The Supreme Court has been more willing to accept
statistics to prove a race discrimination claim in civil contexts such
as jury venire selection and Title VII employment discrimination
cases.74 In these contexts, the proffered statistics relate to fewer
entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged
decisions.75 Conversely, the McCleskey Court was not willing to
infer that the state of Georgia had a racially discriminatory policy of
administering the death penalty by studying the combined effects of
the decisions of thousands of juries, where no two juries were
composed of the same people.76
In order for a court to be convinced that an "unexplained
statistical discrepancy can be said to indicate a consistent policy of
the decisionmaker," 77 a study must focus on repeat actors in the
criminal justice system, such as the district attorney. If a multiple
regression analysis established that race of the victim substantially
impacted a single district attorney's decision to seek out the death
penalty, then a court should accept the study as evidence of
purposeful discrimination. In fact, several studies have been
conducted that focus on the actions of prosecutors throughout a
state.78  But since each prosecutor operates under different
72. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
73. See generally David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA L. REV. 541 (1991).
74. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987).
75. See id. at 295.
76. See id. at 295 n.15.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New
Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 36 (1988); Gennaro F.
Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing Kentucky: An Analysis of the Factors Influencing
Decision Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 483, 502 (1988)
("The pattern of effects demonstrated by the race of the victim-race of the offender
combination indicates that, controlling for differences in the objective heinousness of the
offense, prosecutors are more likely to seek the death penalty when a black kills a white
than in other homicides."); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587, 612 (1985) (finding that among
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prosecuting guidelines as dictated by local district attorneys these
studies do not establish the type of repeat actor evidence the court
requires in order to prevail on an equal protection challenge.
3. The More Striking Evidence of Racism the Better
The more stark the statistical evidence of racial disparities is,
the more likely the court will infer discriminatory intent,
irrespective of how methodologically rigorous the corresponding
study is. The McCleskey Court acknowledged that in rare cases, a
"stark" pattern of statistical evidence can prove discriminatory
intent.79 Specifically, the Court noted two examples in which a
statistical pattern of discriminatory impact demonstrated a
constitutional violation- Gomillion v. Lightfoot8O and Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.81 In Gomillion, a state legislature violated the Fifteenth
Amendment when it altered the boundaries of a city from a square
to a twenty-eight sided shape, and in the process excluded 395 out
of 400 black voters without excluding a single white voter.8 2 In Yick
Wo, local government officials denied laundry store permits to all
Chinese applicants (more than 200 of them), but granted all but one
application from white applicants.83 In both of these cases, the
Court found that the state acted with discriminatory intent without
any "mathematical demonstration" needed to support the claim.8 4
Although an equal protection challenge need not be as extreme
as Yick Wo or Gomillion, these cases are examples of when the Court
was confronted with such striking evidence of discrimination that it
could not help but acknowledge it. Similarly, if a party presents the
Court with a multiple regression analysis that establishes race as an
extremely significant, rather than marginal, factor in the decision to
seek the death penalty, the Court will be more likely to find the
requisite discriminatory intent. As long as the Court learns from its
mistakes and is willing to properly understand the importance of a
multiple regression analysis, there is still reason to believe that a
McCleskey-like challenge will prevail.
Florida homicide cases from a random sample of twenty-one counties, prosecutors were
most likely to pursue the death penalty in cases in which the victim was white).
79. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-94 n.12.
80. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
81. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
82. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
83. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373.
84. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
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E. Lower Courts and McCleskey-like Challenges
Since McCleskey was decided by the United States Supreme
Court, no death penalty conviction has been successfully challenged
on the ground that the penalty was racially discriminatory and
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.85 Although
I argue that the success of such a claim is still possible, this section
of the note offers examples of how lower courts continuously
incorrectly apply the law set forth in McCleskey.
Lower courts are less hospitable to race discrimination claims
than they should be because they are not reasonably applying
McCleskey to county-level, prosecutor-specific claims. 86 McCleskey
holds that statewide data alone cannot establish an individual
defendant's claim of racial discrimination. 87 To ban countywide
data, which encompasses acts by the same decisionmaker over a
period of time, would be to read McCleskey in an overbroad manner.
But unfortunately, this is exactly what courts have done. The
distinction the McCleskey Court made between systemic statistical
showings and statistical showings focused on a single decision
maker has been ignored. Even when a claimant proffers statistical
evidence on a county-wide, prosecutor-specific basis, lower courts
dismiss the claims on the basis that the statistical analysis did not
account for enough variables which could have also explained the
racial disparities.
John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, and Sheri Lynn Johnson
provided a comprehensive analysis of how McCleskey has been
erroneously applied to cases up through 1998 in their Cornell Law
Review article "Post McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in
Capital Sentencing." In this section of my note, I extend their
analysis to include federal cases through 2005. Though the
following discussion does not include every case in which McCleskey
was discussed in the interim time, it includes cases that are
representative of the lower court's continued misapplication of the
law.
85. See, e.g., Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 237 (4th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Webster, 162 F.3d
308, 334 (5th Cir. 1998); Griffin v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1989); State v.
Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 2002); Brooks v. State 990 S.W.2d 278, 289 (Tx. Crim.
App. 1999); Watkins v. Com., 385 S.E.2d 50, 57 (Va. 1989); United States v. Bass, 536 U.S.
862 (2002).
86. See John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-McCleskey
Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1798 (1998).
87. Id. at 1799.
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In a 2003 opinion, the Fourth Circuit held in Bell v. Ozmint, that
a lower court's application of McCleskey reasonably denied the
defendant relief even though the claim was based on a study which
focused on decisions by the county solicitor over a period of time
that included the prosecution of the defendant.88 In this case,
William Bell filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging
his conviction of murder and armed robbery, and the resulting
death sentence. 89 Bell maintained that the State unlawfully based its
decision to seek the death penalty on his race and the race of his
victim. 90
In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the study
presented in the instant case differed in design and methodology
from McCleskey.91 It recognized that the petitioner took special care
to present the court with a study that focused on the actions of
repeat actors responsible for seeking the death penalty, rather than
implicate the entire state in its disparate application of the death
penalty. The court still rejected the evidence that in 66.7 percent of
cases in which an African American killed a White victim county
prosecutors sought the death penalty, whereas the same prosecutors
sought the death penalty in only 8 percent of cases involving other
racial combinations. 92 Such a statistically disparate result could only
be accountable by chance in two times out of one-thousand.93
The court faulted the study for including one year in its ten-
year analysis in which a different solicitor general94 was in
command.95 By doing so, the court ignored the author of the study's
testimony, Cornell Law Professor Theodore Eisenberg, 96 that
inclusion of the death penalty cases in that year did not affect the
overall results of the study.97 The Fourth Circuit also focused on the
fact that the solicitor general had a legitimate reason for seeking the
death penalty because the crime committed involved an enumerated
88. See Bell, 332 F.3d at 237-39.
89. See id. at 231.
90. See id. at 232.
91. See id. at 239 n.4.
92. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 47, Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2003)
(No.02-21).
93. See id.
94. In South Carolina, the "solicitor general" is the title given to county officials
commonly referred to as district attorneys.
95. See Bell, 332 F.3d at 238.
96. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 92, at 44 n.32 (noting that Dr.
Eisenberg is a tenured professor at Cornell Law School and has published several
articles in this area, including an article relied upon by the United States Supreme Court
in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)).
97. Id. at 54 n.40.
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statutory aggravating circumstance. 98 By focusing on this issue, the
court entirely missed the point of the equal protection challenge.
Bell asserts that among all individuals who meet the statutory
requirement of an aggravating factor during the commission of a
murder, race of the victim was a significant factor in determining
who would receive the death penalty.99 Bell did not challenge
whether his actions constituted an aggravating factor. Therefore,
the court's reliance on the solicitor general's testimony that Bell's
actions sufficiently proved the existence of aggravating
circumstances entirely misses the point.
Just at the McCleskey Court mischaracterized the Baldus study
as proving simple correlation, the Fourth Circuit labeled Eisenberg's
study as a simple correlation analysis. The Circuit Court stated that
there is "no basis in Eisenberg's correlations for concluding that the
[solicitor general] discriminated against Bell. . ."100 Rather than
engage with the statistical finding of the study on an intellectual
level, the court preferred to rely on the lower courts' conclusions
and dismiss the methodology of Eisenberg's work in a terse
footnote.
Conversely, in Belmontes v. Brown,101 the Ninth Circuit took
more care in analyzing the supporting study in a race discrimination
claim. UCLA Statistics and Sociology Professor Richard Berk
prepared an expert report which analyzed prosecutors' charging
decisions in 1,322 death-eligible homicides committed in San
Joaquin County from 1977-1986. Berk coded for more than 450
variables, ran numerous regression tests, and concluded that the
odds of being charged with a death penalty-eligible offense varied
significantly according to the race of the victim. 10 2 Specifically,
prosecutors were five times more likely to seek the death penalty for
a defendant who killed a white person than for a defendant who
killed an African American, and twenty times more likely to be
charged with the death penalty than if the victim was Latino103 Not
only are these statistics more extreme than those presented in
McCleskey, but the study was focused on repeat actors within the
system-prosecutors under the direction of a district attorney in San
Juaquin county. The court acknowledged that Belmontes provided
"what the statistics in McCleskey lacked: information specific to the
decisionmaker in his case."1 04 The court also accepted the accuracy
98. See Bell, 332 F.3d at 238-39.
99. Id. at 238.
100. Id. at 239 n.4.
101. Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2005).
102. See id. at 1125.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1127.
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and statistical validity of the sophisticated study.105
Although ultimately the court rejected the claim, its opinion
took time to point out that not all statistical studies presented in this
type of claim would be insufficient as a matter of law. 0 6
Unfortunately, the court avoided confronting the issue of whether
these statistics showed intentional discrimination because it found
that in Belmontes' case, the prosecutor had a legitimate race-neutral
reason for seeking the death penalty. 107 In a similar fashion as the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Bell, the Ninth Circuit was convinced
that the prosecutor's testimony that he sought the death penalty
because the prosecutor believed Belmontes committed a statutorily
enumerated death-eligible murder. Therefore, the court reasoned
that any statistical claim of systemic racial discrimination in the
county prosecutors' charging of the death penalty based on the race
of the victim was successfully rebutted by the specific prosecutor's
claim that he had a legitimate reason to seek the death penalty.
This argument is wholly unpersuasive. If the prosecutor did
not have a statutory basis from which to ground his charge of a
special circumstance, he would not have sought the death penalty in
the first place. And if he did seek the death penalty without a
statutory basis, an appellate court would quickly overturn the
verdict as violative of the statutory structure needed to survive
constitutional scrutiny set forth in Gregg v. Georgia.108
The Ninth Circuit did not consider the likely possibility that a
prosecutor can present a legitimate reason for seeking the death
penalty while simultaneously harboring illegitimate reasons for
seeking the death penalty. Since death penalty charging decisions
are based on a multiplicity of factors, simply presenting one such
factor, which happens to be a legitimate one, in order to rebut a
McClesky-like challenge should not be sufficient. I am not
suggesting that the prosecution should have no opportunity to rebut
the charge of racial discrimination, but I am suggesting that, here,
the prosecution did not present enough evidence to rebut the
McClesky claim.
A prosecutor's rebuttal to a McClesky claim must rebut the
105. See id. at 1125.
106. See id. ("We reject the government's contention that the Supreme Court rejected
similar statistical evidence in McCleskey v. Kemp, and that Belmontes' statistics are
therefore 'insufficient as a matter of law.").
107. See id. at 1128.
108. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (holding that state statutes
which sufficiently channel the sentencer's discretion to eliminate the possibility of an
arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty are unconstitutional, and
requiring a minimal level of guided discretion where states can list aggravating factors
which would qualify a murderer for the death penalty.).
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argument that race played a role in the decision to seek the death
penalty. One way a prosecutor can rebut the McClesky claim would
be to include all of the prosecutor's reasons for seeking the death
penalty, not just one reason. Additionally, courts should look at
these affidavits with scrutiny because they are post-hoc
rationalizations for the decision whether to seek the death penalty.
The prosecutor in Belmontes offered the affidavit in response to the
McClesky challenge.109 To the extent possible, courts should require
prosecutors to document their decision with respect to race and
charging at the time the decision was made. If the Supreme Court
requires a high threshold to be met in a McClesky challenge, then
courts should require a similarly high rebuttal threshold for
prosecutors.
F. McCleskey and the Problem of a Remedy
Although this note focuses on deconstructing McCleskey and
providing alternate routes for proffering race discrimination claims
in the criminal justice context using statistical evidence, some
mention should be made of possible judicial remedies if a court
were to find the presence of racial discrimination in capital
sentencing. Multiple remedies are available ranging from the
abolition of capital punishment, to a race-conscious application of
the death penalty, to a burden shifting procedure as envisioned in
the Racial Justice Act ("RJA"). 11°
The Court might abolish or put a moratorium on the death
penalty until it can be shown that each state's capital sentencing
statute and guidelines are being applied in a non-discriminatory
manner. This, in effect, would establish an affirmative
constitutional obligation to ensure a measure of racial equality in
capital sentencing.' This broad remedy would be a huge step for
the Court, and one that the Court is not likely to take for fear of its
application to other contexts within the criminal justice system.112
109. See Belmontes, 414 F.3d at 1128.
110. H.R. 4442, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). For remarks of Representative Conyers
on introducing the bill, see 134 CoNG. REC. E1174 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988). A version of
the RJA, limited to federal prosecutions, was proposed in the Senate by Senator
Kennedy as Amendment 3683 to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988, but was
defeated. See 134 CONG. REC. S15, 755 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1988). A version that would
apply to the states as well as to the federal government was first proposed in the Senate
by Senator Kennedy as S. 1696, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The RJA has appeared in
several different versions over the years between the two chambers of Congress.
111. Monica Wiley, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race-Conscious Decision Making in Reforming
Capital Sentencing, 3 HOW. SCROLL 81, 103 (1995).
112. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 n.38 (1987).
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The Court may also choose to apply race-conscious measures which
would seek to change the distribution of individuals of other races
sentenced to capital punishment. It is doubtful that a court would
ever invoke this remedy, for it imposes much too harsh of a social
tax upon convicted murderers.113
The Court may choose to avoid creating a systemic change and
focus on individual remedies by providing an easier mechanism for
each litigant to bring his or her claim of race discrimination using
statistical evidence. 114  For instance, the Court might allow
defendants to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by
using statistical evidence of the effects of the death penalty statute,
which the state would have an opportunity to rebut. Absent such a
rebuttal, the defendant would be entitled to relief from his or her
death sentence. This remedy has been widely criticized as allowing
defense attorneys to block death sentences too easily.1 5
Although this note does not take a stance as to which remedy
would be best, this short description highlights three of the myriad
options and difficulties in creating a remedy for a McCleskey
violation.
II. Statistical Evidence in Selective Prosecution Claims
This next section of the note explores a second, and related,
type of claim of racial discrimination within the criminal justice
context. The main issue I explore in this section is how courts treat
statistical studies that attempt to prove racial discrimination when
the focus on the challenge is not necessarily on the death penalty.
Specifically, this section analyzes discovery requirements to prove a
selective prosecution claim after United States v. Armstrong.
A. Discovery Standard to Prove Selective Prosecution- United
States v. Armstrong
In United States v. Armstrong, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the appropriate standard that must be met to obtain
discovery for a selective prosecution claim based on race.116 A
selective prosecution claim forms the basis for a motion to dismiss if
the prosecutor's decision was based on an unconstitutional
113. Id.
114. This suggestion is similar to the Racial Justice Act. See generally supra note 109.
115. Id. at 97.
116. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 (1996).
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rationale.117 A claimant must prove selective prosecution under
"ordinary equal protection standards." 118  Therefore a selective
prosecution claim requires the defendant to prove "that the
prosecutorial policy 'had [both] a discriminatory effect and that it
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose prosecution.' ' 119 As
described above in the McCleskey discussion, the Supreme Court has
been unfriendly to claims that attempt to prove discriminatory
purpose with statistical evidence.
Rather than compare the type of statistical evidence necessary
to prove a general selective prosecution case with the type of
statistical evidence necessary to prove a similar claim in the death
penalty context, this section of the note explores a more elementary
question. In order to begin formulating a selective prosecution
claim, a defendant must have enough data to formulate his/her
argument in the first place. But in order to convince the court that a
defendant should be allowed to obtain discovery in a selective
prosecution claim, the defendant must convince the court that
seeking the evidence is a worthwhile endeavor. This section of the
note describes the type of statistical studies that courts require in
order to allow a defendant to obtain discovery on this issue. Just as
with McCleskey-like claims, courts have erroneously refused to
accept most types of statistical analyses in this endeavor.
B. United States v. Armstrong
In United States v. Armstrong, defendants Armstrong and
Hampton were indicted on charges of conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute more than fifty
grams of crack cocaine, and several federal firearms offenses. 20 In
response to the indictment, the defendants filed a motion for
discovery or for dismissal of the indictment, alleging that they were
selected for federal prosecution because they were black.' 2' In
support of their motion, defendants offered an affidavit by a
"Paralegal Specialist" at the Office of the Federal Public Defender
stating that all twenty-four prosecutions for crack cocaine cases in
1991 were of black defendants. 22
The Supreme Court held that to establish discovery on a claim
117. Id. at 463.
118. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
119. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
120. Id. at 458.
121. Id. at 459.
122. Id.
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of selective prosecution based on race, the claimant must produce
credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races
could have been, but were, not prosecuted. 123 A defendant must
provide the court with "'some evidence tending to show the
existence of the essential elements of the defense,' discriminatory
effect and discriminatory intent." 124 In the instant case, the Court
held that the evidence presented did not establish the similarly
situated requirement because it failed to identify individuals who
were not African American and who could have been, but were not,
prosecuted for the same charged offenses. 125
The Armstrong Court set up a classic "Catch-22" scenario for
defendants attempting to prove a selective prosecution claim. In
order to first obtain the necessary evidence which would allow them
to establish a claim of selective prosecution, they must first present
the court with some evidence tending to show the existence of a
selective prosecution claim. Under this standard, obtaining statistics
on the races of individuals who could have been prosecuted for the
same charge, without the ability to seek discovery, presents a
difficult challenge. 126
C. Meeting the Armstrong Threshold: Lower Courts Struggle
With the Standard
Although the Armstrong Court set a high threshold for
obtaining discovery in a selective prosecution claim, I argue that a
statistical study can be constructed that would pass the scrutiny of
the courts. Thus far, courts have been too strict in applying the
Armstrong standard and no study has yet been constructed that has
supported a successful challenge. Below are a few such examples.
In an opinion issued five months after the Armstrong decision,
the Fourth Circuit misstated a key portion of the Supreme Court
123. Id. at 469.
124. Id. at 468 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)).
125. Id. at 470.
126. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605 (1998) (describing Armstrong's
requirement that a selective prosecution claimant provide "some evidence" that
similarly situated members of other races were not prosecuted as an "absolute
condition" for discovery); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially-
based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J.
127 (2003) (criticizing the lack of clear definitions for selective prosecution claims); Marc
Michael, Note, United States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution- A Futile Defense and Its
Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998) (describing the background
of Armstrong and criticizing the standard of review making it nearly impossible to prove
selective prosecution).
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opinion. In United States v. Olvis, the defendant was indicted for
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and use of a
firearm in relation to drug trafficking.127 Out of the indictments
arising out of the current drug bust, at least three white individuals
have been granted immunity who were just as culpable as the black
defendants, and at least two other culpable white individuals were
not charged.128 The defendants pointed out that more than 90
percent of those who had been tried since 1992 for crack cocaine
offenses in the district court's Norfolk and Newport News areas are
black.129
The district court held that the defendants made a
"nonfrivolous showing in raising a claim of selective prosecution,"
and ordered the government to respond to defendants' formal
requests for discovery into its criteria for selecting whom to
prosecute.130  The combination of statistical evidence and the
government's inconsistency in granting some members of the
conspiracy immunity and prosecuting others satisfied a threshold
showing to grant the discovery request. The government refused to
comply with the discovery order and the court dismissed the
indictment.131
The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court's findings
because the study proffered by Olvis did not adequately specify the
manner in which the government failed to prosecute similarly
situated individuals of other races.1 32 The Court erroneously read
Armstrong to require either (1) a study that statistically proves the
entire number of blacks who were actually committing cocaine
offenses or (2) a study that statistically proves that a greater
percentage of whites could have been prosecuted for such crimes. 133
The Fourth Circuit's requirements go beyond what is required by
Armstrong.
Even though Armstrong requires defendants to satisfy a high
burden to obtain discovery, the Fourth Circuit raises this bar even
higher. Now, individuals in the Fourth Circuit seeking a selective
prosecution claim must either (1) identify all members of their own
race who are committing the drug offense and are not arrested for it,
or (2) show how a "greater" percentage of whites could have been
prosecuted for such a crime. Although the Armstrong Court
required a showing that similarly situated individuals of another
127. See United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 741 (4th Cir. 1996).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 742.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 743.
132. Id. at 745.
133. Id.
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race could have been prosecuted for the same crime, it did not
require a showing of a "greater" percentages of similarly situated
individuals. Nor does Armstrong require an exploration into
criminal activity patterns of every individual of the same race. This
opinion has dramatically changed the Armstrong standard of "some
evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of a
selective prosecution claim" 134 into a standard of conclusive evidence
that shows the existence of the essential elements of a selective
prosecution claim.
Other Circuits have taken a more reasonable approach as to the
type of statistical evidence Armstrong requires. In United States v.
Hayes, the Seventh Circuit held that a local newspaper article
describing the government's propensity to charge firearm offenses
in federal court rather than in state court, combined with the
defense attorney's informal statement that he has personally seen a
pattern of selective prosecutions, was not enough to establish
discovery for a selective prosecution claim.135 In this case, the
newspaper article cited did not make any mention of the race of the
defendants charged in federal court as compared to state court, nor
did the attorney present his statement in the form of an affidavit.136
Here, the Seventh Circuit correctly found that the defendant was not
able to provide even "some" evidence of different treatment for
similarly situated individuals of other races.137
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. Arenas-Ortiz,
closely analyzed a statistical study and fairly concluded that it did
not provide the requisite showing for discovery on a selective
prosecution claim.138 In this case, a defendant submitted several
pieces of statistical evidence in an attempt to demonstrate a racial
disparity between individuals eligible for prosecution for illegally
re-entering the country and individuals charged for the crime.139
The main piece of statistical evidence utilized by the defendant
attempted to show that the percentage of eligible Hispanic
defendants for prosecution (66.6 percent) was significantly lower
than the percentage of actual Hispanic defendants charged for this
crime (94.5 percent).140
The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that this study was
flawed because the researcher incorrectly assumed that 66.6 percent
of the illegal immigrant prison population are Hispanic simply
134. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996) (emphasis added).
135. United States v. Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 894-96 (7th Cir. 2001).
136. Id. at 895.
137. Id. at 896.
138. United States v. Arenas-Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003).
139. Id. at 1069.
140. Id.
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because 66.6 percent of the state's illegal immigrant population is
Hispanic.141 This assumption is faulty because it assumes that
members of a racial group commit crimes at a rate proportionate to
their representation in the overall population. The defendant also
failed to provide the court with evidence regarding the frequency
that members of other races illegally re-enter the United States. 142
These two statistical missteps fatally flawed the defendant's
selective prosecution discovery request.
United States z,. Bass provides a telling example of how difficult
it is for a defendant to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution
claim. 143 Here, the United States Supreme Court overruled the Sixth
Circuit's opinion which upheld the trial court's motion for discovery
of information relating to the government's capital charging
practices.144  Bass argued that a survey conducted by the
Department of Justice combined with other statistical evidence
presented evidence tending to show that selective prosecutions taint
the death penalty protocol. 145 Specifically, Bass made four points
with supporting statistics. First, he argued that there was a
significant difference between the percentage of white and black
prisoners in the general federal prison population (57 percent white;
38 percent black).146 Second, he showed that the government
entered into plea bargains with 48 percent of the white defendants
against whom it sought the death penalty compared to 25 percent of
similarly situated black defendants. 147 Third, he argued that the
percentages by race of the type of death-eligible crime charged were
vastly different (16 percent of death-eligible whites were charged
with firearms murder, compared with 32 percent of death eligible
blacks; and 15 percent of death-eligible whites were charged with
racketeering murder, compared with 22 percent of death eligible
whites).14' Fourth, Bass presented statistics which tended to show
that blacks are no more likely to commit violent federal offenses
than whites (for instance 28 percent of people sentenced for federal
murder were white, while 18 percent were black).149
The Sixth Circuit held that by including plea bargaining
statistics, Bass accounted for a group of similarly situated
defendants, whose crimes shared sufficient aggravating factors that
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1070.
143. United States v. Bass, ;36 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam decision).
144. Id. at 863.
145. United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
146. Id. at 537.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing 1999 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics).
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allowed the government to pursue the death penalty against each of
them.150 The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the government's
argument that McCleskey precludes all lower courts from making
any inference of intentional race discrimination from statistics.151
Additionally the court notes that at this stage in the proceeding, the
court must only determine whether Bass has shown "some evidence
tending to show the existence" of discriminatory effects and
discriminatory intent in order to warrant discovery. 5 2 Bass does not
have to prove the merits of the case at this point. Therefore, the
court ultimately affirmed the district court's discovery order.153
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's opinion
and quickly issued a short Per Curiam opinion reversing the district
court's discovery order.15 4  Without addressing the distinction
between the level of showing required for discover compared to
actually proving a selective prosecution claim, the Court simply
stated that Bass failed to submit relevant evidence that similarly
situated persons were treated differently1SS The statistics did not
persuade the High Court because they said "nothing about charges
brought against similarly situated defendants."156 Just as in Armstrong
though, the Court failed to define exactly what it meant by
"similarly situated defendants." Here, Bass presented evidence that
compared races of individuals eligible for the death penalty,
receiving the death penalty, receiving plea bargains, and crimes
charged. It is frustratingly unclear what more the court would like
to see.
The Supreme Court found the plea bargaining evidence "less
relevant" because in Bass's situation, he was offered an agreement
but rejected it.157 The Court would not take a step beyond the fact
that regardless of whether the government offered him a plea
bargain, these overall statistics are relevant in presenting a larger
picture of how the government treats similarly situated defendants.
Although the fact that Bass received a plea offer might cut against
Bass in an analysis of the merits of his equal protection claim, at this
stage of the litigation, where Bass is merely seeking discovery, he
has persuasively established some evidence tending to show the
existence of a constitutional violation.
It is also important to note that this Armstrong claim is made in
150. Id. at 539.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 540.
153. Id.
154. United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 864 (2002).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the context of a death penalty prosecution. After McCleskey, cases
challenging the death penalty based on racial discrimination have
largely fallen on deaf ears. 158 The Court would rather quickly
dismiss claims of governmental race discrimination then allow
statistics to broaden the discussion.
D. Crafting a Winning Armstrong Study
The same general standards outlined above for crafting a strong
statistical study to prevail in a McCleskey claim also apply to an
Armstrong claim. 5 9 A study presented to the court (1) must have
sound methodology, (2) should focus on repeat actors, and (3) the
more striking results the study contains, the better.
1. Methodology
As the section above shows, many claimants have presented the
court with either anecdotal evidence of selective prosecutions or
statistically unsound methods for gathering and presenting data. In
order to prevail on an Armstrong claim, a defendant must present
the court with statistically valid conclusions. For instance, a well
done multiple regression analysis that has taken into account an
appropriate sample size and all relevant variables,160 should
convince the court of some evidence tending to prove a selective
prosecution claim.
2. Focus on Repeat Players
Although selective prosecution claims by definition focus on
the actions of repeat players such as prosecutors, studies that focus
more narrowly on the actions of prosecutors within a specific county
(or even the actions of a specific prosecutor within a county), will
more likely prevail. In United States v. Bass, the Supreme Court
hinted that it would be more receptive to statistics that narrowly
focus on decisionmakers that directly affect the claimants' case.' 61
158. See supra, Part I.E, "Lower Courts and McCleskey-like Challenges."
159. See supra, Part I.D, "Prevailing With Statistical Evidence After McCleskey."
160. See id.
161. See United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863-64 (2002) ("Even assuming that the
Armstrong requirement can be satisfied by a nationwide showing (as opposed to a
showing regarding the record of the decisionmakers in respondent's case), raw statistics
regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated
defendants.").
Spring 2007]
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
The Court implied that "nationwide" statistics tending to show
selective prosecution in an individual's case was too broad of a
generalization to apply to an individual. 62
3. Striking Results
If a study can present courts with studies that contain evidence
of striking disparities between the prosecution of different races,
these courts will less likely scrutinize the data therein. There is a
point at which common sense steps in to inform the courts that a
"mathematical demonstration" is not required to prove
discrimination. 163 I am not suggesting that only Yick Wo-like racial
disparities will satisfy the Armstrong requirement. Rather I am
arguing that the more a study begins to look like Yick Wo, the more
likely a court will refrain from its natural inclination to immediately
reject statistical claims of racial discrimination in a criminal justice
context.
III. Using Studies in Non-Race Discrimination Claims in the
Criminal Justice Context
In this final section of the note, I briefly describe the Supreme
Court's treatment of studies that help prove constitutional
violations, other than racial discrimination, in the criminal justice
context. Specifically, I analyze two landmark cases in which the
Court concluded that it is cruel and unusual punishment to apply
the death penalty to the mentally retarded, Atkins v. Virginia,164 and
to juveniles, Roper v. Simmons.165 I particularly chose to analyze
cases within the death penalty context because they provide an
interesting comparison with McCleskey, which was also a death
penalty case. The Supreme Court has been especially hesitant to
overturn death penalty convictions. Additionally, the Supreme
Court recognizes that death penalty cases represent societys most
extreme form of punishment and thus lies at the heart of the
criminal justice system. 166
162. Id.
163. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
164. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
165. Roper v. Sinmnons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
166. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 ("McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of
the State's criminal justice system. 'One of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting
the lives of its citizens and one of the most basic way in which it achieves the task is
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An analysis of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishment" inherently necessitates exploring
contemporary norms and principles. 67 Although this is a very
different type of constitutional claim than those presented in either
McCleskey or Armstrong, there is no reason why the Court would
scrutinize a study any more or less in one context rather than
another. Just as McCleskey scrutinized the import of the statistical
findings in the Baldus study, the Supreme Court should scrutinize
the import of statistical findings with respect to whether an
individual is competent enough to be eligible for the death penalty.
This is not to say that the Court does not have sound reasons to give
studies different weights when it comes to analyzing the sufficiency
of the study in proving an underlying claim. Rather, irrespective of
the weight the Court grants a study, Justices should still scrutinize
the findings and methodology to an extent where the Court can then
determine if the study can reasonably be relied upon.
A. Atkins v. Virginia
In Atkins v. Virginia, Darryl Atkins was sentenced to death for
robbing a victim at gunpoint and then shooting him eight times.168
Based on a review of Atkins' school and court records, Atkins' score
of fifty-nine on a standard intelligence test, and interviews with
Atkins and others familiar with him, a psychologist testified that
Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded." 169 Nevertheless, under state
law, a jury sentenced Atkins to be executed, and the Virginia
Supreme Court rejected arguments that a mentally retarded
defendant cannot be sentenced to death.7 0
In reversing the death sentence, the Supreme Court looked to
many sources in society to find that "evolving standards of
decency" now preclude executing the mentally retarded. 17' The
court looked to social scientific evidence to determine whether
mentally retarded individuals should be treated in general as less
culpable than others, and less capable than others of defending
themselves against false or misleading accusations. The Court
noted that although mentally retarded persons frequently know the
through criminal laws against murder.'" (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226
(1976) (White, J., concurring)).
167. Trop v. Dulles, 336 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
168. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
169. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 309-310.
171. Id. at 311-12.
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difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand
trial, their personal culpability is nevertheless diminished.172 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court simply stated this assertion and
cited six studies in the footnotes, rather than describe any
supporting social scientific studies.17 3, 174
I do not dispute whether the research actually supports the
decision reached by the majority and undermines Scalia's dissenting
argument that deficiencies of mental retardation do not make
individuals more susceptible to impulsive, criminal conduct. In fact,
it is true that statistics regarding the number of mentally retarded
death row inmates, when compared to the base rate of the disability,
supports the notion that this population is more prone to
committing serious capital offenses. 175 Deficits in cognition, moral
understanding, and social skills among the mentally retarded also
strongly support the conclusion that these individuals are more
susceptible to committing impulsive, serious crimes for which they
are not fully culpable and cannot be fully deterred. 176
Yet, the Court does even not take a critical eye to the statistical
or scientific evidence presented in these studies. 177 Nor does the
Court question the fact that none of the studies cited in the opinion
were written within five years of the Atkins opinion. Although the
studies might be completely methodologically sound, the Court
doesn't take the time to explain why it trusts these studies any more
than the ones presented in prior McCleskey or Armstrong challenges.
The Court appears to treat these studies as support for the
normative statement that the court simply shouldn't be executing
the mentally retarded rather than as empirical evidence. 7 8 While
172. Id. at 318.
173. Id. at 318 n.23 (See e.g., J. McGee & F. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants
with Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in The Criminal Justice System and
Mental Retardation 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R. Luckasson, & G. Bouthilet eds.1992);
Appelbaum & Appelbaum, Criminal Justice Related Competencies in Defendants with Mental
Retardation, 14 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 483, 487-489 (Winter 1994);
174. Id. at 318 n.24 (See e.g., Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants,
53 GEO.WASH. L.REV. 414, 429 (1985); Levy-Shiff, Kedem, & Sevillia, Ego Identity in
Mentally Retarded Adolescents, 94 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 541, 547 (1990); Whitman,
Self Regulation and Mental Retardation, 94 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 347, 360 (1990);
Everington & Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of
Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212-13, 535 (1999)).
175. See Daniel B. Kessler, Atkins v. Virginia: Suggestions for the Accurate Diagnosis for
Mentally Retardation, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 422 (2003).
176. See id. (citing John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to
Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 742-46 (1988)).
177. In this section, I do not mean to criticize or support the outcome the Court
reached in Atkins. Rather, I write to criticize the method in which the Court engages
with social scientific studies in this context as compared to in McCleskey or Armstrong.
178. Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for
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this conclusion satisfied many death penalty abolitionists, it
nevertheless left future litigants to wonder why the Court readily
deferred to these studies when it scrupulously criticized the findings
presented by studies in McCleskey and Armstong. By merely
relegating the social scientific support in Atkins into a footnote, the
Court implies that the conclusions from these studies can be taken at
face value, without articulating a reason for doing so.
B. Roper v. Simmons 179
Two years after the Atkins opinion, in Roper v. Simmons, the
Supreme Court decided that executing individuals who committed
a crime while under the age of eighteen would also violate the
Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. At the
age of seventeen, while still a junior in high school, Christopher
Simmons planned and committed a capital murder.180 Just as in
Atkins, the Court analyzed evolving standards of decency in its
Eighth Amendment Analysis. After reviewing the legal rules for
executing juveniles in various states, the Court attempted to bolster
its argument with social scientific evidence.
The Court noted three categorical differences between juveniles
and adults, and supported each with at least one social scientific
study. First, by nature of their immaturity and irresponsibility,
juveniles are more prone to reckless behavior.1 81 Second, juveniles
are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures.18 2
Third, a juvenile's character is not as well formed as an adult's. 183
Together these differences create a categorically diminished
culpability of juveniles. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
penological justifications for the death penalty simply do not apply
to juveniles with the same force as they do to adults.184
Rather than merely relegate the studies that support these
findings to a footnote, the Court briefly quoted conclusions from
these studies. For instance, to support the notion that juveniles
often act irresponsibly, the opinion quoted the finding that
"adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every
category of reckless behavior." 18 5 Similarly, to bolster the idea that
Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 471-472 (2003).
179. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
180. See id. at 555.
181. See id. at 569.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 570.
184. See id. at 571.
185. See id. at 569 (quoting Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
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juveniles are more susceptible to outside pressures, the Court
parenthetically quoted a recent article in the American Psychologist,
"as legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to
extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting."18 6
Though the Roper Court attempted to include more information
from these studies than those cited in Atkins, the majority in Roper
still failed to substantively scrutinize these studies. Rather than
challenge the reliability or sufficiency of the data in any these
studies, the majority again adopted the studies' conclusions
wholesale. For instance, the social scientific community does not
wholeheartedly embrace the Court's notion that these psychological
differences account for all juvenile crime. 8 7 In fact, the Court
ignores the reality that empirically concluding anything about
human development is a very difficult endeavor. For instance, the
theories espoused by one of the researchers the Court relied upon,
Erik Erikson, are actually highly controversial. 8 8 Erikson argues
that innate stages of human development exist whereas other
psychologists emphasize incremental phases rather than
predetermined stages. 189 The American Psychological Association
openly acknowledges that the dividing line between adolescence
and adulthood is inexact.190
By not articulating its basis for accepting the conclusions
contained in the studies it cited, the Roper Court cannot escape the
criticism that it has avoided an important analytic issue. When
compared to the Court's intense scrutiny of social scientific studies
in the specific contexts of McCleskey and Armstrong challenges, the
Court chose not to scrutinize the studies in Atkins and Roper in a
similar manner. In fact, the Court does not appear to have utilized
any reasoned approach for adopting one method for analyzing
studies presented in race discrimination claims within the criminal
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REvIEW 339 (1992)).
186. See id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturiy, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 1014 (2003).
187. See Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International
Equipose, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2005).
188. See id.
189. Compare ERIK ERI(SON, IDENTITY, YOUTH, AND CRISIS 92-93 (1968) ("Personality,
therefore, can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the human
organism's readiness ... to interact with a widening radius of significant individuals
and institutions."); with the Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the
Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 4-16, Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) (referring to the general tendencies of
adolescents as a group, recognizing that there will be individualized deviations from the
norm.).
190. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 188, at 4.
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justice system versus studies presented in other (non-racial
discrimination) types of claims the within the criminal justice
system.
Conclusion
When courts face the intersection of race and the criminal
justice system they have been less than eager to rely on social
scientific studies to prove discrimination. Yet, the highly critical
attitude towards statistical studies does not necessarily pervade the
Court's reasoning in criminal justice issues outside of race
discrimination, as evidenced by the brief discussion of Atkins and
Roper. It is helpful for litigants to at least acknowledge that the
Court has varying attitudes towards its reliance on social scientific
studies. Litigants should be cautioned, however, from concluding
that the Court's lax approach to these studies in certain areas of the
law will persist.
Even though social scientific studies have often failed to
convince the Supreme Court of racial discrimination in criminal
cases, litigants should not abandon the use of this type of evidence
in making their claims. I have described ways in which litigants can
craft studies and corresponding legal arguments so that courts are
more likely to accept the conclusions contained therein. Although
much of society would like to confidently claim that the racial
disparities in our criminal justice system are not due to any racial
discrimination, the more accurate statement is that race
discrimination claims in a criminal justice context are currently very
difficult to prove in court. Social scientific studies can be a powerful
tool to help litigants make these claims. But in order to prevail,
litigants need to work with social scientists to conduct better
studies, and courts need to be more open to appreciating the value
of these studies.
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